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FISHER GOVERNOR CO. 1J. SUPERIOR CoURT

[53 C.2d

[So F. No. 20299. In Bank. Dee. 8, 1959.]

FISHER GOVERNOR COMPANY (a Corporation), Petitioner, V. SUPERIOR COURT OF THE CITY AND
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent; VALEEN O. PRESTWICH et a1., Real Parties in Interest..
Corporatio~Foreign

Corporations-Doing Business.-Under
Code Civ. Proc., § 411, subd. 2, authorizing service of process
on foreign corporations that are "doing business in this State,"
the quoted words are a descriptive term that the courts have
equated with such minimum contacts with the state that
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice, and whatever limitation it
imposes is equivalent to that of the due process clause.
[2] Id.-Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-"Doing business
in this State," within the meaning of Code Civ. Proc., § 411,
subd. 2, is synonymous with the power of the state to subject
foreign corporations to local process.
[3] Id.-Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-Although a foreign corporation may have sufficient contacts with a state to
justify an assumption of jurisdiction over it to enforce causes
of action having no relation to its activities in that state,
more contacts are required for the assumption of such extensive
jurisdiction than sales promotion within the state by independent nonexclusive sales representatives. To hold otherwise would subject any corporation that promotes the sales
of its goods on a nationwide basis to suit anywhere in the
United States without regard to other considerations bearing
on the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it
was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.
[4] Id.-Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-The interest of
the state in providing a forum for its residents or in regulating the business involved, the relative availability of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one place
rather than another, the ease of access to an alternative forum,
the avoidance of multiplicity of suits and conflicting adjudications, and the extent to which the cause of action arose out of
defendant foreign corporation's local activities, are relevant
to the inquiry whether jurisdiction may constitutionally be
assumed against such corporation on the theory that it was
doing business in the state.

[1]

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Foreign Corporations, § 34 et seq. i Am.Jur.,
Foreign Corporations, § 360 et seq.
McB:. Dig. Reference: [1-5] Corporations, § 898.
J
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[5] Id.-Foreign Corporations-Doing Business.-In actions for
wrongful death and personal injuries against· an Iowa corporation when a gas meter and pressure reducing station exploded owing to defective equipment manufactured by such
corporation, defendant was not doing business in this state so
as to be amenable to process where the causes of action did not
arise out of and were not related to defendant's activities in
this state, but the relevant events occurred in Idaho, where·
evidence could be produced as easily or more easily elsewhere,
where even if plaintiffs could not secure jurisdiction over defendant in Idaho, they could prosecute their actions against
the corporation as conveniently in Iowa as in this state, and
where there was no evidence to support plaintiffs' contention
that jurisdiction over the corporation's codefendants could
only be secured in California and that therefore jurisdiction
over the corporation was justified to avoid duplicity of litigation.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the Superior Court
of the City and County of San Francisco to enter its order
quashing service of summons. Writ granted.
Pelton, Gunther, Durney & Gudmundson, George W.
Granger and Thomas N. Kearney for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Carroll, Davis, Burdick & McDonough and Francis Carroll
for Real Parties in Interest.
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner Fisher Governor Company, an
Iowa corporation, seeks a writ of mandate to compel the
Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco to
enter its order quashing service of summons in three actions
brought by plaintiffs, the real parties in interest in this proceeding. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 416.3.) The actions were
brought to recover damages for the wrongful deaths of Lowell
Prestwich and Donald B. Eatchel and for personal injuries
suffered by Clifford Turner. The complaints allege that the
injuries and deaths occurred in Kimberly, Idaho, when a gas
meter and pressure reducing station exploded owing to defective equipment manufactured by Fisher. Plaintiffs joined
various other corporations as defendants. Fisher was served
by making personal service in California on George R. Friederich and Company, a manufacturers' agent who sells Fisher's
products. (See Corp. Code, § 6500.) Fisher appeared ape-
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cially in each action and moved to quash the service of summons on the ground that it was not doing business in this
state. Its motions were denied.
[1] Code of Civil Procedure, section 411, subdivision 2,
authorizes service of process on foreign corporations that are
"doing business in this Stat-e." "That term is a descriptive
one that the courts have equated with such minimum contacts
with the state 'that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" (International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 [66 S.Ot. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057].) Whatever
limitation it imposes is equivalent to that of the due process
clause [2] '" [D) oing business" within the meaning of
section 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure is synonymous
with the power of the state to subject foreign corporations to
local process.' (Eclipse Fuel etc. CO. Y. Superior Court, 148
Cal.App.2d 736, 738 [307 P.2d 739] . . . . )" (Henry R. Jahn
&- Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 855, 858-859 [323 P.2d
437]; Carl F. W. Borgward, O.M.B.H. v. Superior Court,
51 Ca1.2d 72, 75 [330 P.2d 789] ; Cosper v. Smith &- Wesson
Arms Co., ante, p. 77, 82 [346 P.2d 409].)
Although Fisher's principal offices and manufacturing
plants are in Iowa and it has no employ~es or property in
California and has not appointed an agent to receive service
of process here, plaintiffs contend that Fisher's sales activities
in this state are sufficient to subject it to the jurisdiction of
our courts even if the causes of action are not related to those
activities. Fisher's products are sold in California through
independent manufacturers' agents who also sell similar products of other manufacturers. These agents receive commissions on sales made of Fisher's products and provide Fisher's
catalogues to interested persons on request. Fisher is listed
in telephone books at the agents' addresses and numbers.
In Cosper v. Smith &- Wesson Arms Co., supra, ante,
p. 77, we held that essentially similar sales activities in this
state were sufficient to sustain jurisdiction when the cause
of action arose out of the sale in this state of a defective gun
manufactured by Smith and Wesson that exploded injuring
a California resident here. In the present case, the causes of
action arose in Idaho, the defective equipment was not sold
in this state, neither of the decedents was a California resident, and none of the plaintiffs are California residents. The
causes of action are not related to any business done by Fisher
here.
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[3] Although a foreign corporation may have sufficient
contacts with a state to justify an assumption of jurisdiction
over it to enforce causes of action having no relation to its
activities in that state (Perkins v. Bcnguet Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437,445-447 [72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485] ; International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, 326 U.S. 310,318; Le Vecke
v. Griesedieck Western Brewery Co., 233 F.2d 772, 777-778;
Koninklijke L. M. v. Superior Court, 107 Cal.App.2d 495,
500-501 [237 P.2d 297]), more contacts are required for the
assumption of such extensive jurisdiction than sales and sales
promotion within the state by independent nonexclusive sales
representatives. (LeVecke v. Griesedieck Western Brewery
Co., supra, 233 F.2d 772, 776-777; W. H. Elliott & Sons Co.
v. Np,odex PrOd1tCts Co., 243 F.2d 116, 122, concurring opinion;
L. D. Reeder Contractors of Arizona v. Higgins Industries,
265 F.2d 768,779; Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, 132 F.Supp. 838,
852-854; see A. G. Bliss Co. v. United Carr Fastener Co. of
Canada, 116 F.Supp. 291, 294, aff'd., 213 F.2d 541.) To
hold otherwise would subject any corporation that promotes
the sales of its goods on a nationwide basis to suit anywhere
in the United States without regard to other considerations
bearing on "the fair and orderly administration of the laws
which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure."
(International Shoe Co. v. Washington, S1lpra, 326 U.S. 310,
319; see also, L. D. Reeder Contractors of Arizona v. Higgins
Industries, supra, 265 F.2d 768, 779.) Accordingly, we must
look beyond defendant's sales activities in this state to determine whether jurisdiction may constitutionally be assumed.
[ 4] The interest of the state in providing a forum for
its residents (McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220, 223 [78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223]) or in regulating the
business involved (Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643, 647-648 [70 S.Ct. 927, 94 L.Ed. 1154]) ; the relative
availability of evidence and the burden of defense and prosecution in one place rather than another (McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra, 355 U.S. 220, 223-224; Henry R.
Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, supra, 49 Ca1.2d 855, 861-862;
Carl F. W. Borgward, G.M.B.H. v. Superior Court, supra,
51 Ca1.2d 72, 79; Cosper v. Smith &- Wesson Arms Co .•
supra, ante, pp. 77, 83); the ease of access to an alternative forum (Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, supra, 339
U.S. 643, 648-649) ; the avoidance of multiplicity of suits and
conflicting adjudications (Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior
Court, supra, 49 Ca1.2d 855, 862; Carl F. W. Borgward,
Ii3
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G.M.B.H. v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Ca1.2d 72, 79; Gordon
Armstrong Co. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal.App.2d 211, 219
[325 P.2d 21] ; see also, Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.
2d 338, 347·348 [316 P.2d 960); and the extent to which
the cause of action arose out of defendant's local activities
(Inter'Mtional Shoe Co. v. Washingt07l, supra, 326 U.S. 310,
319; McGee v. Inter'Mtional Life Ins. Co., supra, 355 U.S.
220, 223; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251·253 [78 S.Ot.
1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283); Henry B. Jahn & Son v. Superior
Court, supra, 49 Ca1.2d 855, 860.861, and cases cited; CarZ
F. W. Borgward, G.M.B.H. v. Superior Court, supra, 51
Ca1.2d 72, 79; Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., supra,
ante, pp. 77, 83; Gordon Armstrong Co. v. Superior Court,
supra, 160 Cal.App.2d 211, 219·220; Florence Nighti7l.
gale School of Nursing v. Superior Court, 168 Cal.App.2d
74, 81·83 [335 P.2d 240) ; Holtkamp v. States Marine Corp.,
165 Cal.App.2d 131, 138-139 [331 P.2d 679] ; see also Owens v.
Superior C011rt, 52 Ca1.2d 822, 830-831 [345 P.2d 921])
are all relevant to this inquiry. (See 108 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 131.)
[ 5 ] None of these considerations supports an assumption
of jurisdiction in plaintiffs' actions. The causes of action did
not arise out of and are not related to Fisher's activities in
this state, and none of the relevant events occurred here.
(CI. Jeter v. Austin Trailer Equipmen.t Co., 122 Cal.App.2d
376,378 [265 P.2d 130).) Evidence can be produced as easily
or more easily elsewhere, and even if plaintiffs cannot secure
jurisdiction over Fisher in Idaho, they can prosecute their
actions against Fisher as conveniently in Iowa as here. Moreover, although plaintiffs contend that jurisdiction over Fisher's
codefendants can only be secured in California and that
therefore jurisdiction over Fisher is justified to avoid a duplicity of litigation, there is no evidence in the record before
us to support that contention. The relationship between Fisher
and its codefendants and the basis of plaintiffs' actions against
Fisher's codefendants do not appear, and there is no reason
to assume that by supplying equipment for installation in
Idaho, Fisher knowingly injected itself into a transaction or
operation of its codefendants having substantial California
contacts related to the causes of action. (See Atkinson v.
Superior Court, supra, 49 Ca1.2d 338; cl. Hanson v. Denckla,
supra, 357 U.S. 235, 253-254.)
Let the peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., McComb, J., Peters, J.,
and White J. concurred.
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[53 C.2d 227; 1 Cal.Rptr. 169, 347 P.2d 3051

[L. A. No. 25674.

In Bank. Dec. 9, 1959.J

VENTURA PORT DISTRICT et al., Respondents, v. THE
TAXPAYERS, PROPERTY OWNERS, CIT1ZENS
AND ELECTORS OF THE VENTURA PORT DISTRIC'r et al., Defendants; FLORENCE L. GREGORY,
Appellant.
[1] Waters-Harbors-Port Districts.-Under Harb. & Nav. Code,

-)

§ 6233, the establishment and legal existence of a port district
under the Port District Act (Harb. & Nav. Code, §§ 6200-6372)
and all legal proceedings in respect thereto are valid in every
respect and incontestable unless proceedings denying the validity of its establishment are commenced within 60 days after
the date of filing in the office of the secretary of state of the
certificate of the board of supervisors canvassing and certifying the results of the election on the proposed district organization.
[2] Id.-Harbors-Port Districts.-A port district could validly
finance the acquisition and construction of a recreational harbor
under the Port District Act, as against the objection that the
enterprise for which the bonds were proposed to. be issued
contemplated and was limited to a marina or small-craft recreational harbor, where, though the district's master plan and
the economic study made by the district included in their respective titles the terms "Small Craft Harbor" and "Small
Craft Marina," no limitation was placed on access to and usc
of the facilities contemplated othcr than such limitations as
might be inherent in the plans and specifications themselves,
and where use by smaller vessels engaged in commercial, as well
as recreational, pursuits was contemplated. The fact that it
was planned to construct a marina first did not deprive the
district of its authority to construct it.
[8] Id.-Harbors-Port Distriets.-A state loan obtained by the
Ventura Port District to enable the district to purchase real
property necessary for a harbor and marina site and for engineering and construction of the marina was validated by the
First and Second Validating Acts of 1959 (Stats. 1959, chap.
1447, p. 3723; chap. 1448, p. 3728), sinee the definition of
"bonds," as Sl't forth in the validating acts, encompassed the
obligation of the district to repay the state loan from its revenues. Since the state loan was incurred for payment of part
of the cost of the marina project, the acts, in validating the
!licK. Dig. References: [1-3,5] Waters, § 434; [4J Statutes, § 10.

